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SUGGESTED OPENING REMARKS AT PROJECT USEFUL

27 October 1958

Good Morning. It is my pleasure to welcome you to the Central Intelligence Agency.

You have been selected by your parent Services to meet with us to be briefed concerning the organization and mission of CIA. I am gratified to see so large a group. You are the fifth group to participate in Project USEFUL since its inception in 1954 at the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Over the next two weeks a number of our people will talk with you on subjects which have been selected to assure that you receive, within the need-to-know principle, a deep insight into the CIA. The program is primarily designed to identify this Agency's capabilities and limitations in supporting the military forces in wartime. I hope that after those two weeks you will return to your parent service with a real understanding of CIA's role in national security.

Many things have happened since the first Project USEFUL in 1954.

Some of these changes have occurred very directly in the field of our joint planning for war. In 1954, CIA was not clearly certain of its role in relation to military operations in war and its role in preparation for war. As an agency, we may then have given the impression that we could or would do much more in war than we were -- or are -- capable of doing. Since that time, we have worked closely with all levels of the military to clarify our wartime role in relation to yours. Our joint planning with you has been tightened on the basis of several important understandings. We have mutually recognized that wartime operations of military scale and scope should be conducted by military elements, not by CIA. We have mutually recognized that CIA's wartime role is to do those specific things which we are

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uniquely equipped to do, not to try to compete with the military in things you can do better. We have mutually recognized that CIA's preparatory role in peacetime is to carry out those peacetime clandestine actions which are required as the foundation for effective military action in war. In 1954 there was some danger that our CIA war planning might become planning for competition with military efforts in war. It is a matter of major significance that CIA war planning today is closely and directly complementary to military plans and needs.

Since 1954, the spectacular events of Sputnik, U.S. lunar probes, and missiles have opened up implications for the intelligence field which we have hardly begun to comprehend.

Our use of the products of intelligence activities continues to improve. We know more about our enemy, although certainly not all we would like to know. As a direct aid to national policy, our national estimating process has been revised and honed to produce estimates which are significantly more meaningful and useful than just a few years ago.

In the past year, there have been several important developments specifically in activities and organization of the Intelligence Community. One of the most significant of these, particularly in terms of early-warning intelligence, is the establishment of a world-wide communications network for Critical Intelligence reporting. The system has been named CRITIC. CRITIC is designed, first, to ensure early recognition and segregation of Critical Intelligence. Secondly, its aim is to speed up the flow of the critical information to the decision center in Washington, by reducing the human element in communications as much as possible.

Under CRITIC, field reporting personnel have been given lists of these matters that should be available to the highest authorities in Washington within ten minutes to

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one hour of the identification of the information. Information of this kind is reported in short messages, carrying the indicator CRITIC, and will carry the highest handling and transmission priorities. The CRITIC indicator also serves as a collective address, because a CRITIC message upon arrival in Washington is forwarded immediately and simultaneously to all main components of the Intelligence Community. Each Agency participating in CRITIC has established arrangements for twenty-four hour coverage by its watch officer to handle CRITIC messages in his particular agency. CIA has established procedures for appropriately notifying the White House upon receipt of Critical Intelligence messages.

However, the CRITIC system, if dependent upon existing communications facilities, cannot be expected to meet the desired objectives of ten minutes and one-hour speeds of service. Therefore, there are already plans approved by the National Security Council for expanding the present National Security Agency's net. Twelve automatic relay centers located at key points throughout the world will be established. These relay centers will be inter-connected with Washington, and with each other, by the best communication means available to the U.S. Government. Each potential source of Critical information will be connected at an appropriate point into this network. The complete system will be fully automatic throughout, including the use of automatic cryptographic equipment and automatic relay equipment at the relay centers. This will make it possible for an important message, originating, for example, in the Middle East, to be filed at a Middle East station and automatically relayed through the communications network and to be simultaneously received in six to ten offices in Washington. The relay equipment in the system will automatically stop any other messages being passed on the network to allow the Critical Intelligence message to pass through without delay.

Under the present communications facilities, CRITIC has already brought about considerable improvement. On the basis of a few weeks trial, CRITIC messages are arriving in the hands of intelligence evaluating personnel on the average of one hour and twenty-three minutes after a message is filed by the originator in the field.

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Of course, new technical developments in the communication field may provide opportunity for even greater improvements than we can now envisage. It is the responsibility of our communications people to keep pace with these developments and to demand their application when it is clear that such application will materially improve our intelligence communications system. For example, today, our communicators are watching with interest the development of such things as moon relay communication techniques, as well as the utilization of space satellites for communications purposes. They are engaged in developing anti-jamming equipment which will cut down or eliminate the possibility of communications disruption by an enemy. They are also alert to new research and development which will help meet our ever-increasing requirements to transmit routine materials from the field to Washington.

I would like to tell you briefly about two other developments during the past year that vitally concern the intelligence field. The first is the establishment, on 15 September of this year, of the United States Intelligence Board, known simply as the "Intelligence Board". In this body are vested the responsibilities previously discharged by the Intelligence Advisory Committee and the U.S. Communications Intelligence Board. This should do much to avoid duplication and to streamline the U.S. intelligence efforts.

Another item I wish to mention is our successful development of a machine translation system. A month or two ago I observed the first real test of machine translation. I was impressed. We have passed the break-through stage of this problem and are entering the stage of refinement and production.

The experts tell me that for a long time they were disturbed about what to do in the case of colloquialisms. After they got the machine working pretty well, they decided to test it and they put in the colloquialism: "The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak." When translated into Russian and back into English, it read: "The whiskey is good, but the meat is bad." So there are still few minor bugs, but we're well on the way.

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All of these developments increase the need for close and continuing cooperation between the Department of Defense and CIA, and make it all the more important that responsible military officers have a full appreciation of CIA's mission and capabilities. In recognition of this need, we have a continuing program for briefing senior commanders and staff officers of all the Military Services -- an average of over 250 individual briefings are given each year and we provide lecturers to all the senior War Colleges, as well as to many Staff Schools of all three Military Services.

In working relationships, our personnel are in constant association with the Military throughout the world and while we are primarily a civilian organization, we are fortunate to have nearly military personnel on our rolls and an additional number of civilians who are active in the several Military Reserve Units within the Agency. Many of our top positions are held by Military men and I can proudly report that men from the Services have done some extremely outstanding jobs for their country while with us. I could give you many more examples of the excellent cooperation that exists. 25X9A2

You men have been selected, and we give this course to you, because your responsibilities especially involve you in matters which require this close and continuing cooperation between the Department of Defense and the CIA. Your focus is the planning of those wartime military operations in which it will be useful to you to have the support of the assets and know-how of this Agency. Ours is to work with you to make your requirements for our support as realistic and feasible as possible, to develop our capabilities to meet your requirements as fully as we can within the limitations of our administrative resources and the priority urgency of current operations, and to keep you informed on what we will and will not be able to do.

When the relationship in war will be as close as our agreements and plans call for, it is obvious that we have to know a great deal about each other and plan very closely together now. We appreciate very much that elements of the Department of Defense have taken our war planning representatives far into their confidence on

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matters which involve us and our problems. We intend this course to be an important part of our reciprocation of that confidence and cooperation.

I hope you will find the next two weeks enjoyable and, as the Project's name implies, useful.

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